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Abstract—This paper presents the design and describes the 
advantage of the state-of-the-art Mobile Integrated 
Conditional Access System (MICAS) concerning 
interoperability, personalisation, security and operational costs 
in Pay-TV systems. The Message Handling Subsystem is 
proposed and outlined together with ‘Follow-Me’ service, 
which proposed herewith to extend mobility and 
personalisation concepts on Pay-TV services1.  
 
Index Terms—Conditional Access System (CAS), Pay-TV, 
DVB, GSM, Mobile Phone, Set-top Box (STB), SIM Card. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 HE security consideration is an essential part of any 
business in Pay Television and hence critical to 
development of successful digital television businesses. 
Europe and USA were some of the fist countries that 
realised the necessity of Conditional Access (CA) systems 
to prevent unauthorised users to access to the contents in 
Pay-TV services. Conditional access system consists of 
technical services like coding, scrambling, and transmission 
and decoding, descrambling techniques as well as 
administrative services such as subscription management 
and STB deployment in the field and etc. 
There have been commercial issues concerned with the 
implementation of open standard CAS and control of the 
specification, the distribution and use of STB containing the 
CA functions. As a consequence, a vertical market for Pay-
TV industry has been generated that forms a business chain 
of service provider, CAS provider, STB manufacturer and 
subscriber. In this market, a proper interoperability between 
various CASs is compromised and as such, the operator and 
eventually the subscriber have to accept the consequent cost 
of service and STB deployment. It is worthwhile to mention 
that deployment cost is the highest cost for service provider 
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beside the content itself. Techniques like common 
scrambling in conjunction with MPEG standard data 
transport mechanism used in Simulcrypt and common 
interface in Multicrypt, smart-card based solutions and 
downloadable conditional access systems have been 
proposed and, in some cases, deployed to satisfy the 
commercial requirements of broadcasters and operators. 
Nevertheless, none of them provides an interactive, 
standardised, resilient, scalable, updatable and cost-
effective solution for CAS whereby service provider and 
subscriber in broadcasting systems can truly benefit [2].  
The conditional access and service protection system 
commonly adopts a hierarchical system for security key 
management with response to scrambling and encoding 
purposes. For instance in DVB system, the content is 
scrambled by Control Words (CW), which are broadcast to 
the receivers via Entitlement Control Message (ECM). The 
ECM are encoded using the Service key that is associated 
with a service or programme or channel and is valid for a 
period of time depending on the type of subscription. The 
information of the Service key is included to Entitlement 
Management Message (EMM). The EMM itself is encoded 
using Master key shared with the service provider and 
security module available at the receiver. The ECM and 
EMM are broadcast along with the content to all the 
receivers. Each receiver filters its own messages (the 
messages are addressed to the individual receivers) and 
decrypts it using the information received by EMM and 
stored in the security module (i.e. smart-card). If the 
subscriber is authorised to access to the content, the CWs 
will be released to descramble the content. Figure below 
shows the block diagram used in DVB Conditional Access 
system [4]. Fig. 1 shows the data flow diagram of a typical 
hierarchical DVB conditional access system. 
 
Fig. 1.  A typical DVB Conditional Access System. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SYSTEM 
The proprietary conditional access systems employed in 
broadcasting system contain specific security-related 
information and algorithms to scramble/descramble the 
content in order to be solely accessible for authorised 
subscribers via specific STBs.  The challenges and pitfalls 
which are commonly observed in current Pay-TV systems 
are as follows.  
Security-related information (i.e. ECM and EMM 
messages) that is needed to descramble the content is 
broadcast to all active receivers within the operator’s 
coverage area. This method of delivery of sensitive 
information is not considered secure and bandwidth 
efficient.  
The service provider must accept the deployment cost 
since the STBs and security module (smart-card) are 
delivered directly to its subscriber(s).  
Moreover, a certified engineer needs to go to the site to 
install STB and undergo the binding process of STB and 
smart-card. This would prevent the smart-card being used in 
another STB. Such STBs are tailored to one specific service 
provider, especially to the CAS employed by this service 
provider. The STB producer also needs to pay licence fee in 
order to use the CAS in his STB and sign non-disclosure 
agreement with the CA provider to enable his STB products 
to receive and decode the pay-TV programmes scrambled 
by this CAS. This obvious loss of commercial scale and 
licence fee for CA subsystem make STBs quite expensive 
and since the public are reluctant to buy such kind of STBs, 
the operator has to provide them free of charge or indeed 
subsidise them. This contribution, however, will be 
eventually added to the subscription fee for the liable 
subscribers. Therefore, the high subscription fee would 
discourage public to subscribe to TV services and 
consequently encourage them to illegally attempt to access 
to the contents, which would result in revenue loss for 
service provider [1].  
Furthermore, in case of security flaws, the service 
provider can not distinguish the compromised security keys 
and identify the corresponding subscriber, since he does not 
interact with the receiver end. Moreover, revoking the 
compromised keys and security algorithms and substituting 
them would impose additional cost to the service provider. 
Additionally, in this business case, the subscriber is 
compelled to bind to one specific STB pre-determined by 
the service provider, as such he can not access to his 
entitlements via an arbitrary certified STB when he is not 
home.  
The CA architectures presented herein will address all of 
the concerns above and provide an infrastructure to offer the 
subscriber a Follow-Me service whereby subscriber’s right 
will be recognised by his service provider. Hence, the 
subscriber can enjoy his entitlements via any STB receiving 
the service provider’s content. The proposed architectures 
will enable the service provider to study his customers, 
improve the security and offer more personalised services 
based on the information received from the receiver end.  
III. SYSTEM MODEL & ARCHITECTURES 
In this section various security architectures are presented 
together with the details of the employed subsystems and 
their interactions. The architectures are elaborated and 
analysed with regards to possible key distributions and 
security processing needed in the typical Conditional 
Access system. The architectures mainly address issues 
imposed by traditional Pay-TV systems; interoperability, 
high cost of service deployment and revoking compromised 
keys, interactivity and binding customers to particular 
technologies and receivers. 
Fig. 2 shows the system model of the GSM integrated 
Conditional Access system. 
 
Fig. 2. The System model of GSM Integrated Conditional Access System. 
 
The Message Handling Subsystem (MHSS), possible 
architectures of integrated STB and Mobile Phone CAS and 
Follow-Me service are detailed as follows. 
A. Message Handling Subsystem (MHSS) 
The Message Handling Subsystem (MHSS) is a 
subsystem operating at the transmitter side as an interface 
between subscriber and broadcaster in GSM network. It 
receives the subscriber’s subscription request and performs 
mutual authentication along with initial tests to identify 
whether the request is made by valid sources (subscriber 
and STB). After having identified the subscriber and 
corresponding STB, it places requests with Subscriber 
Management Subsystem (SMS) and Billing Subsystem. It 
also downloads the security APIs (algorithms) to the SIM 
card in the mobile phone, if it is needed [6].  
Upon receiving the request from MHSS, the SMS 
decides, based on criteria like customer product selection 
and payment status, if – and for which services – the user 
shall be authorised. The SMS requests the Subscriber 
Authorisation System (SAS) to generate EMMs and/or 
ECM. The key information used to generate entitlement 
messages are then sent to MHSS to be delivered to the 
mobile phone for security-related functions and 
descrambling processes. The MHSS also handles the 
transactions by forwarding the requests to the Billing 
system. The SMS and SAS, defined in this architecture, 
function similarly to what is defined in the broadcasting 
systems like DVB with the enhancement of capability to 
input and output from/to the MHSS. 
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The possible data flow diagrams and processing model 
containing STB, mobile phone (SIM card) and service 
provider or broadcaster are described as follows. 
B. APIs used in MICAS 
The requisite applications used in MICAS architectures 
are as follows.  
- The Subscription Request Handler is a MIDLet running 
on the mobile phone that provides subscriber with an 
interface to select the service provider from a pre-defined 
list of service providers and generates and sends a 
subscription request to the service provider. The 
transmission protocol between mobile phone and service 
provider in for instance GSM technology may be Short 
Message Service (SMS) or Wireless Application Protocol 
(WAP).   
- The Mutual Authentication communicates with MHSS to 
perform a mutual authentication process between subscriber 
and service provider. It might be implemented as a sub-
function of Subscriber Request Handler described above. 
- The Conditional Access Handler is an applet installed in 
SIM with access to privileged domains. It is downloaded to 
the SIM by MHSS and performs security-sensitive 
algorithms and communications. Its functionalities may vary 
at each proposal. 
- The Communication Daemon is an application installed 
in STB. It interfaces the STB to the outside through 
interaction channel (i.e. GSM). It contains a series of APIs 
installed by STB manufacturer to access the privileged 
domains and performs security-related algorithms. It 
communicates with Conditional Access Handler to prepare 
a secure communication channel in pairing process. It 
provides Conditional Access Handler with the STB identity 
which must be obtainable solely to communication daemon 
privileged user by special rights. 
The Conditional Access Handler generates a message 
containing International Subscriber Identity Number (IMSI) 
and/or International Mobile Equipment Number (IMEI) and 
STB Identity Number (STB ID) provided by 
Communication Daemon. It then sends the message to the 
MHSS to verify if subscriber and STB are valid and 
compliant to the standards. 
The MHSS identifies the subscriber and his equipment 
using IMSI and IMEI and checks if they are valid and 
unique in the system. For security purposes, the Conditional 
Access Handler may check the number and origin of 
requests and also contact mobile network operator to 
ascertain the IMSI and IMEI numbers. The STB_ID 
indicates the type of STB, which is used to authenticate 
STB. The STBs may be registered with service provider or 
with a special agency to ensure that they are compliant to 
the standards for service and content protections and 
implement standard specifications. The MHSS transfers the 
Master key and subscriber’s right (Security Objects) to the 
Conditional Access Handler in SIM card. 
The ‘initialisation step’ is a procedure common in all 
security architectures presented herewith and refers to 
pairing of mobile phone and STB, submitting subscription 
request through subscriber’s mobile phone, authorising the 
request, identification of subscriber, validation of STB, and 
finally sending and installing security applets in a secure 
domain(s) in the subscriber’s SIM card. 
The possible data flow diagrams and processing model 
containing STB, mobile phone (SIM card) and service 
provider or broadcaster are described as follows. 
C. Decoding of EMM & ECM at STB using Security 
Objects delivered via mobile phone 
The Conditional Access Handler delivers the credentials 
to the Communication Daemon in STB, where EMM and 
ECM are received. Communication Daemon provides the 
Security Objects to the security algorithms embedded in 
STB to decrypt EMM and extract Service key to decrypt 
ECM. The subscriber’s rights are checked upon, the rights 
needed to watch the content (as inserted in ECM), and if the 
condition is satisfied, the CWs are released to descramble 
the content. 
Fig. 3 shows the subsystems and data flow diagram when 
mobile phone plays an intermediary role to deliver Security 
Objects (Master Key and list of entitlements) to the STB. 
This information is used at STB to decode EMM and ECM 
and descramble digital contents. 
 
Fig. 3. The data flow of a 3-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
all security functions take place in STB. 
 
D. Decoding of EMM at SIM card and ECM at STB 
using Security Objects delivered to the SIM card 
After having established the initialisation step, the 
Communication Daemon forwards the EMM to the 
Conditional Access Handler. The Conditional Access 
Handler decrypts EMM and extracts Service key using the 
knowledge of Master key obtained from Security Objects 
(Master key and Subscriber’s rights) received from service 
provider. The Conditional Access Handler then forwards 
the Service key and subscriber’s rights to the 
Communication Daemon to be used by security algorithms 
embedded in STB for decryption of ECM and extraction of 
CWs.  
Fig. 4 shows the data flow diagram when EMM is 
broadcast on-air and delivered to the subscriber’s mobile 
phone to be decoded.  
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Fig. 4. The data flow of a 3-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
EMM and ECM decoding is balanced between STB and mobile phone. 
 
E. Decoding of EMM & ECM at SIM card using 
Security Objects delivered to the SIM card 
In this architecture, after establishing the initialisation 
step, the Communication Daemon forwards the EMM and 
ECM to the Conditional Access Handler. The security 
algorithms placed in Conditional Access Handler using the 
Security Objects (Master key and Subscriber’s rights) 
received from service provider decrypts the EMM and 
extracts the Service key to be used for decryption of ECM 
and extraction of CWs. The Conditional Access Handler 
then transfers the CWs to Communication Daemon for 
descrambling the content. 
Fig. 5 shows the data flow diagram when all decoding 
processes concerning EMM and ECM messages take place 
in the subscriber’s mobile phone (SIM card). 
 
Fig. 4. The data flow of a 3-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
EMM and ECM decoding takes place in the mobile phone. 
In proposals C, D and E, the entitlements messages 
(ECM and EMM) are broadcast to the receivers and the key 
information to open the encrypted EMM is delivered 
through the return channel (GSM network).  
F. Decoding of EMM & ECM at STB using EMM 
delivered via mobile phone 
After having established the initialisation step, the MHSS 
transfers EMM message to the Conditional Access Handler. 
The EMM contains the information of Service key and 
subscriber’s rights, but may not be limited. The Conditional 
Access Handler transfers the EMM to Communication 
Daemon. The Communication Daemon provides EMM 
message to the security-related algorithms to decrypt ECM 
(received from broadcast channel) and extract CWs for 
descrambling the content only if the subscriber is entitled to 
access to the content. 
Fig. 6 shows the data flow diagram when EMM is 
delivered to the subscriber’s mobile phone through GSM 
network. The mobile phone then forwards the message to 
the STB for decoding of ECM and descrambling contents.  
 
Fig. 5. The data flow of a 3-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
EMM is transferred via mobile network and all security functions take 
place in the STB. 
 
G. Decoding of EMM at SIM card and ECM at STB 
using EMM delivered to the SIM card 
After having established the initialisation step, the MHSS 
transfers EMM message to the Conditional Access Handler. 
The EMM message is opened in SIM card and Service key 
and subscriber’s rights are then extracted and transferred to 
the Communication Daemon. The Communication Daemon 
provides Service key and entitlements to the security 
algorithms embedded in STB to decrypt the ECM that is 
received from broadcast channel. If the subscriber is entitled 
to access to the content, CWs are used to descramble the 
content.  
Fig. 7 shows the data flow diagram when EMM is 
delivered through GSM network and processed at 
subscriber’s mobile phone (SIM card) to extract service key 
and entitlements sent to STB for decoding ECM and 
descrambling contents. 
 
Fig. 6. The data flow of a 3-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
EMM is transferred via mobile network and EMM & ECM decoding is 
balanced between STB and mobile phone. 
 
H. Decoding of EMM and ECM at SIM card using 
EMM delivered to the SIM card 
After having established the initiating, the MHSS 
transfers EMM message to the SIM card to the Conditional 
Access Handler. The Communication Daemon transfers the 
ECM to the Conditional Access Handler to decrypt ECM 
using the knowledge of Service key conveyed with EMM 
and extract CWs if subscriber’s rights match the programme 
right inserted in ECM message. The Conditional Access 
Handler passes the CWs to the Communication Daemon to 
descramble the content.  
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Fig. 7. The data flow of a 3-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
EMM is transferred via mobile network and EMM & ECM decoding takes 
place in the mobile phone. 
It is worthwhile noting that utilising GSM network to 
send EMM messages would save more bandwidth for the 
broadcaster.  
I. Decoding of ECM at STB using the Security 
Objects delivered via mobile phone 
Fig. 9 presents the data flow diagram when Master Key is 
not used in the key hierarchy. In this case, Security Objects 
including Service Key as the highest key in the key 
hierarchy together with entitlements are delivered through 
GSM network to the subscriber’s mobile phone to be 
delivered to the STB. The ECM decoding and content 
descrambling processes take place in the STB. 
 
Fig. 8. The data flow of a 2-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
all security functions take place in the STB. 
After initialisation step, the MHSS transfers Service key 
and subscriber’s rights (Security Objects) to the Conditional 
Access Handler to transfer the Security Objects to the 
Communication Daemon. The Service key and subscriber’s 
entitlements may be used by Communication Daemon or 
security algorithms embedded in the STB to decrypt ECM 
broadcasted to the receivers. If subscriber is entitled to 
access the content, the CWs are released to descramble the 
content. 
J. Decoding of ECM at SIM card using the Security 
Objects delivered to the SIM card 
After having established the initialisation step, the MHSS 
transfers Service key and subscriber’s rights (Security 
Objects) to the Conditional Access Handler. The 
Communication Daemon transfers the ECM to the 
Conditional Access Handler to decrypt the ECM using the 
Service key and extracts CWs if subscriber’s right match the 
criteria set for the content. The Conditional Access Handler 
sends the CWs to the Communication Daemon to be used 
for descrambling of the content.  
Fig. 10 shows the data flow diagram when Security 
Objects (Service Key and entitlements) and ECM messages 
are delivered to the subscriber’s mobile phone respectively 
from GSM network and STB. The decoding process takes 
place in subscriber’s mobile phone and the extracted CWs 
are delivered to the STB for descrambling process. 
 
Fig. 9. The data flow of a 2-level hierarchical security architecture wherein 
ECM decoding takes place in the mobile phone. 
Following remarks are valid for all proposed 
architectures. 
- Making smart card an optional entity will enable free-
viewers to benefit from Pay-TV services; 
- Mobile phone can be replaced by any device with similar 
capability in communication and storing security-sensitive 
data (i.e. a STB with GSM connectivity);  
- Service providers can update and/or revoke the 
compromised security key(s) and/or algorithms online 
through GSM network;  
- The encryption, session key and digital signature 
techniques together with mutual authentication technique 
will enhance security of the system; 
- Service provider(s) can download their own security 
algorithms into the subscriber’s SIM card through GSM 
network followed by delivery of requisite key information 
to enable authorised people access contents. In the other 
hand, the platform enables service providers monitor the 
behaviour of subscriber which results in enriching range of 
bespoke services and improving security mechanism. One 
of services that can be introduced in this platform is 
‘Follow-Me’ service, which enables the subscriber to access 
to the content upon his entitlement without the requirement 
of being bound to a specific STB. The service would give 
freedom of choice to the subscriber with regards to the point 
of connection to the system and therefore enables 
subscription entitlements to follow the subscriber even 
when he travels. The Follow-Me service can be applicable 
in the existing broadcast infrastructure. However, a 
mechanism should be adopted to eliminate the rigid and 
pre-defined one-to-one relationship between subscriber and 
STB. The approach is to identify both elements (subscriber 
and STB) based on the unique identities such as that which 
is used in mobile networks to identify the subscriber (IMSI) 
and identify the mobile device (IMEI). Such conditions are 
met by proposed architectures wherein a proper 
infrastructure is established to offer Follow-Me type of 
services to the customers. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORKS 
In this document, high-level security architectures for 
provisioning a horizontal market in Pay-TV industry and 
architectures for establishing interoperability amongst 
various CASs were provided. The Mobile Integrated 
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Conditional Access System (MICAS) was detailed 
considering various architectures to deliver key information 
that is needed to descramble requested contents at an 
arbitrary STB located at the vicinity of the subscriber.  The 
main benefits and novel aspects of the system were fully 
outlined. Furthermore, the Follow-Me service and Message 
Handling Subsystem (MHSS) in the broadcasting system 
were also described. 
The MHSS as a new entity in the broadcasting system 
operates at the transmitter side and handles communication 
between service provider and subscriber via cellular 
network. It interacts with subscriber via mobile phone and 
passes subscriber’s subscription request to the existing 
Subscriber Management and Subscriber Authentication 
Subsystems to authorise corresponding rights. The 
authorised rights together with security key information will 
be sent by MHSS to the subscriber’s mobile phone. 
Depending on the architecture, the decryption and 
descrambling process of security messages may take place 
in the SIM card of the mobile phone and/or in the trusted 
STB unit. 
The system can reduce the cost for service provider and 
end-users by respectively cutting down the service 
deployment cost and eliminating the requirement of 
additional receiver as changing the service provider. 
Moreover, it can improve the overall security in the system 
by interacting with receiver and downloading new security 
mechanisms online as and when it is needed. Furthermore, 
the functions of revoking the compromised keys and 
monitoring the contractual behaviour of the subscriber can 
be performed cost-effectively through interaction channel 
provided by mobile network: GSM and its descendants like 
UMTS, 3G and etc. The Conditional Access system 
proposed here can improve the personalisation concept in 
broadcasting networks and provides subscriber with 
ubiquitous access to their entitlements as defined by 
Follow-Me service.  
It is worthwhile noting that the concurrency between 
delivery and processing of entitlement messages are very 
important to the success of the proposed architectures. 
Failure to present digital contents shortly after a service 
being subscribed would likely cause customer 
dissatisfaction and raise complaints. Hence, implementation 
of underlying subsystems which are operating at transmitter 
side, mobile phone and STB and also considering 
appropriate transport protocols are of great importance. 
Least but not the last it is important to make sure that 
sufficient security requirements are guaranteed in 
architectures. Therefore, analysing security threads and 
introducing security counter-attacks play great role in 
success of the proposal too. Our research which we are in 
the process of conducting addresses, the above mentioned 
concerns thorough analysis of the message delivery latency 
introduced by GSM protocols, security measurements and 
implementation aspects of the subsystems.  
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